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ABSTRACT
The Location Service (LCS) proposed by the telecommuni-
cation industry is an architecture that allows the location of
mobile devices to be accessed in various applications. We ex-
plore the use of LCS in location-enhanced server authentica-
tion, which traditionally relies on certificates. Given recent
incidents involving certificate authorities, various techniques
to strengthen server authentication were proposed. They fo-
cus on improving the certificate validation process, such as
pinning, revocation, or multi-path probing. In this paper, we
propose using the server’s geographic location as a second
factor of its authenticity. Our solution, SALVE, achieves
location-based server authentication by using secure DNS
resolution and by leveraging LCS for location measurements.
We develop a TLS extension that enables the client to verify
the server’s location in addition to its certificate. Successful
server authentication therefore requires a valid certificate
and the server’s presence at a legitimate geographic loca-
tion, e.g., on the premises of a data center. SALVE prevents
server impersonation by remote adversaries with mis-issued
certificates or stolen private keys of the legitimate server.
We develop a prototype implementation and our evaluation
in real-world settings shows that it incurs minimal impact
to the average server throughput. Our solution is backward
compatible and can be integrated with existing approaches
for improving server authentication in TLS.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Network security; Authen-
tication; •Networks → Application layer protocols;
Keywords
Location Service; TLS; server authentication; location-based
authentication
1. INTRODUCTION
The Location Service architecture (LCS) [7] is a platform
in the telecommunication infrastructure that disseminates
location information of mobile devices. It abstracts away
specific methods used to estimate the location of devices
within the network and provides a unified interface for third-
party access. Such information can be used in a variety of
location-based services, such as social networking, naviga-
tion, localized advertising or emergency response. When es-
timated using secure localization methods, location further
becomes a unique characteristic of the mobile device.
Location information obtained from mobile networks can
be used in critical security applications. In particular, we
explore the adoption of location information provided by
LCS as a second factor of web server authentication. This
is motivated by the fact that security-critical online services
(e.g., financial services [43, 68], e-health services [59]) are
often hosted at dedicated and physically-protected locations.
The on-site protection makes it difficult or expensive for an
adversary to infiltrate such data centers. This is especially
true for remote attackers that are located far away from the
target server. As a result, the server’s presence in protected
data center locations can be regarded as an additional factor
of its authenticity.
The need for another factor of authentication stems from
the limitations of current server authentication solutions.
Currently, server authentication is achieved using Transport
Layer Security (TLS) and public key certificates issued by
Certificate Authorities (CAs). However, recent incidents of
CA compromise [26, 30, 41, 65] and flaws in the trust model
underlying the public key infrastructure [20] have resulted
in server impersonation attacks [49]. To prevent such at-
tacks, a wide range of solutions that focus on strengthening
server authentication have been proposed. These include
approaches such as key pinning [64, 65], multi-path prob-
ing [38, 70], certificate revocation [48, 62], short-lived cer-
tificates [67], or channel-bound credentials [11, 37]. These
techniques mitigate attacks where the adversary has a mis-
issued certificate binding the server’s domain name to the
adversary’s key. However, they do not thwart an attacker
that learns the secret key of the server. Some of them, such
as certificate revocation or short-lived certificates, may at
best reduce the time window of attack.
We apply location-based authentication to strengthen the
current certificate-based server authentication in TLS. In
our approach, the server must prove its location to the client
in addition to presenting a valid certificate. While the use
of geographic location has been proposed for client authen-
tication [40, 42, 63], it has not been applied to server au-
thentication, which poses a number of new challenges. In
order to use location information for server authentication,
we identify the following three requirements: (i) an infras-
tructure to securely estimate the current location of a server,
(ii) an infrastructure to securely collect and disseminate the
legitimate locations of a server, and (iii) a mechanism that
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allows a client to check that the current location of the server
matches its legitimate location during a TLS handshake.
Our solution, SALVE, is built on three existing technolo-
gies: the Location Service (LCS), Domain Name Service
(DNS) [46] and TLS. We extend LCS to issue verifiable
statements containing the location of a server. We use DNS
to securely collect and disseminate the set of legitimate lo-
cations of a server, potentially deployed in different data
centers globally. Using DNS to disseminate server location
information is seamlessly integrated with the client since it
already uses DNS to fetch the server’s IP address. The use of
DNSSEC further allows the client to verify the authenticity
of DNS data. Finally, we extend TLS to enable the client to
verify the server’s location statement, issued by LCS, and
check that it matches the location fetched via DNS. As a
result, a remote attacker with a valid certificate but who
does not co-locate with the victim server is unable to imper-
sonate it unless it further compromises LCS or DNS. The
design of SALVE is backward compatible and requires only
small modifications to existing solutions and the verification
process is transparent to the user.
Contributions. In this paper, we make the following con-
tributions. We present SALVE, a novel framework to au-
thenticate a server using its geographic location as a second
authentication factor. Our solution resists server imperson-
ation attacks where a remote attacker obtains a fraudulent
server certificate or the server’s secret key. We show that our
approach can be realized using existing technologies such as
DNS, LCS, and TLS. We further demonstrate the feasibil-
ity of SALVE by means of a prototype implementation and
perform a large scale evaluation using PlanetLab [1]. Our
results show that SALVE does not incur a significant impact
to overall performance and only reduces server throughput
(number of requests per second) by 4.3% on average. Finally,
we discuss extensions of our approach and how it can be in-
tegrated with other existing solutions for improving server
authentication in TLS.
Outline. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We
present our motivation and give a brief background on the
Location Service architecture, the functions of DNS, and the
TLS handshake in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe the
design of SALVE, our location-based server authentication
framework. We analyze the security of SALVE in Section 4.
In Section 5, we describe our prototype implementation.
We further evaluate our implementation in Section 6. In
Section 7, we discuss possible extensions, optimizations and
limitations of SALVE. The conclusion is in Section 9.
2. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
We first motivate the potential and benefits of location-
based server authentication. We then review the main tech-
nologies used in this work: the Location Service architecture,
DNS with DNSSEC, and TLS.
2.1 Physically-Secured Data Centers
There is a growing trend towards the use of dedicated
and protected data centers for hosting web services, allow-
ing server locations to be leveraged as a second factor for
authentication. We analyze the top 20 websites listed by
Alexa [3] and find that they (e.g., Google [28]) are all hosted
in dedicated data centers. Furthermore, financial institu-
tions like VISA [68] and MasterCard [43] use data centers
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Figure 1: The LCS architecture. A SIM is localized by
the telecommunication operator using its base stations. A
third party queries the GMLC for the SIM’s location using
the Mobile Location Protocol. The GMLC enforces access
control mechanisms to ensure that only specified parties are
authorized to query for a specific SIM.
with enhanced physical security. Standards like ISO/IEC
27001 for certifying the security measures of data centers
have also been developed [2]. In practice, data centers used
for security-critical applications are additionally protected
by several on-site security measures. For example, Google’s
data centers [27] are protected using electronic access cards,
perimeter fencing, biometrics, multifactor authentication,
access logs, indoor and outdoor surveillance cameras, etc.
Additionally, data centers are increasingly being built in re-
mote areas to provide physical isolation and secure storage
of sensitive data [33].
In summary, as sensitive websites are attractive targets
for the adversary, they are often deployed in private data
centers with strong physical security measures. This mo-
tivates the use of website location as a unique attribute of
critical services that can be leveraged as an additional factor
for server authentication.
2.2 Location Service Architecture (LCS)
The Location Service architecture [7] allows the dissemi-
nation of location information about mobile devices. It en-
ables a wide range of location-based services, such as emer-
gency call positioning for rescue and support, location-based
advertising, or tracking of assets and personnel. As shown in
Figure 1, LCS consists of the following components: mobile
devices with Subscriber Identity Modules (SIMs), base sta-
tions and network switching centers of telecommunication
operators, the Gateway Mobile Location Center (GMLC),
and various third parties or services. A mobile device has a
SIM that base stations can localize (further detailed below).
The operator stores the location information of each SIM at
its network operator switching center. The location infor-
mation is exposed through the GMLC, which is accessed by
various location-based services or other third parties such as
emergency services.
Localization Techniques. The telecommunication opera-
tor may use different techniques to localize a SIM within its
network, such as Cell IDs which identify the cell to which
the SIM is connected [61]. More accurate localization tech-
niques such as U-TDOA [61] or Enhanced Cell ID [6] also
exist. These techniques use multiple base stations to mea-
sure the duration of signal transmission between the SIM
and the base stations to estimate its location. Alternatively,
the base stations can measure received signal power to lo-
calize the SIM. In this paper, we assume the presence of
a localization system and that SIM locations are already
available at the operator through the GMLC.
Mobile Location Protocol. Location-based services or
other authorized third parties communicate with the GMLC
using the Mobile Location Protocol (MLP) [51]. MLP is an
XML-based application layer protocol and is independent of
the underlying physical network and the localization infras-
tructure. Using MLP, a user can query the GMLC for the
location of a specific SIM. MLP supports query authentica-
tion, e.g., using passwords or pre-established session identi-
fiers. The GMLC also implements access control to ensure
that a user querying for a given SIM is authorized to do so.
For example, the owner of a SIM may register and authorize
himself with the GMLC or define which other parties are
authorized to query for its own location.
2.3 DNS and DNSSEC
Browsers currently use DNS to obtain the IP addresses
of websites to establish connections. IP address information
is provided by website owners to DNS servers during the
domain registration process. DNS is a hierarchical service
that translates domain names to IP addresses in a recur-
sive manner, referred to as DNS lookup. A domain’s IP
address can be obtained from one or a group of DNS au-
thoritative servers. The client starts by querying a recur-
sive server for the IP address of a target domain, such as
www.example.com. This recursive server then issues recur-
sive queries to various DNS servers starting from the root
authoritative server. This is followed by requests to a series
of authoritative servers (in this example, the authoritative
server of .com and then the one of example.com) until the
IP address of the domain in question is obtained.
The responses of the DNS servers are organized as resource
records. Several types of resource records exist [46]. The
most prominent among them is the A record that contains
the IP address of the server for a given domain (AAAA for
IPv6). If the A record is not available, the authoritative
server provides a NS record which contains the IP address
of the next authoritative server to be queried. Root DNS
servers are maintained by ICANN, and other DNS servers
are usually maintained by various Internet Service Providers
or DNS registrars.
DNS Security Extensions. By design, DNS does not
ensure the authenticity of resource records and is vulner-
able to attacks such as DNS cache poisoning. To address
this, DNSSEC [8–10] extends DNS with additional resource
records used to authenticate existing records. DNSSEC as-
sumes a public key infrastructure for the authoritative servers.
Each authoritative server includes three additional types of
records in its reply: (i) RRSIG records, containing the signa-
tures on the other resource records, (ii) the DNSKEY record,
containing the authoritative server’s public key which can
be used to verify the RRSIG records, and (iii) the DS record
that includes the hash of the public key of a child domain’s
authoritative server (if any). The public keys of the au-
thoritative servers form a chain of trust starting at the root
server. For example, the root server supplies the DS record
for the authoritative server of .com which, in turn, supplies
the DS record for the authoritative server of example.com.
The hash of the root server’s public key must be known a
priori by the querying client (e.g., browser) as a trust anchor.
2.4 TLS Handshake
A client connects to the server after learning its IP address
from DNS. To ensure communication security, the client and
the server typically establish a secure session using TLS [22].
A TLS session is created through the process of a TLS hand-
shake, which consists of the following steps: (i) the server
sends its public key certificate to the client, who validates
it to check the server’s authenticity, (ii) the server option-
ally verifies the client’s authenticity in the same way, and
(iii) the two peers engage in a key exchange protocol to de-
rive a shared master secret for secure communication.1 The
master secret is then used by both parties to generate sym-
metric session keys for encryption and authentication of all
future communication within the TLS session.
Key Exchange Protocols. Various key exchange pro-
tocols exist for TLS. Since we later consider an adversary
who may steal the secret key of the server, we focus on the
key exchange variants of TLS that are based on ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithms [24] (detailed in Sec-
tion 4). These include TLS DHE and TLS ECDHE, which
are currently used by major online service providers like
Google [29] and Twitter [32] because they provide forward
secrecy. The security of the implementation of Diffie-Hellman
handshakes have been explored by Bhargavan et al. [15] and
improved using the TLS Session Hash and Extended Master
Secret Extension [54]. In this work, using this extension, we
assume that TLS master secrets are unique across different
client-server sessions.
3. SALVE: LOCATION-BASED SERVER
AUTHENTICATION
3.1 Overview
We now introduce our approach for location-based server
authentication. We start by describing the system model,
the set-up, and the attacker model.
System Model. We consider the typical scenario where a
client (such as a browser) connects to a web service (e.g.,
online banking) using TLS. The service can optionally be
hosted at multiple servers deployed in different physically-
protected data centers around the world.
Prerequisites. We assume that the legitimate IP address
and location information of the web servers are provided
by the domain owner to the DNS registrar. Legitimate loca-
tions can be stored in DNS using the existing LOC records [21].
We further use DNSSEC to authenticate DNS records. We
also assume the existence of the LCS architecture that can
be used to localize the web servers. Each web server has a
dedicated SIM2 registered to LCS. The telecommunication
1More specifically, the client and the server first agree on a
pre-master secret, which is then used to derive the master
secret and subsequently discarded from memory.
2SIMs can be attached to servers through interfaces such as
PCI-E or USB. Antennas can be installed outside the server
room for better signal reception.
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Figure 2: Overview of SALVE. The client first fetches the
legitimate server location information from DNS using the
Location-Aware DNS Lookup. The client then uses this in-
formation to authenticate the server during the Location-
Aware TLS Handshake, which involves the GMLC generat-
ing a location statement for the server. The attacker is re-
mote and has access to the communication channel between
the client and the server.
operator regularly localizes the SIMs and updates their loca-
tions in the switching center. The GMLC is configured such
that the legitimate web servers are the only parties autho-
rized to query for the location of their own SIMs. Commu-
nication with the GMLC occurs over a secure channel (e.g,
using TLS). The GMLC also has a public-private key pair,
denoted by skG and pkG, respectively. The client knows the
GMLC’s public key and the hash of the root DNS server
public key. This can be achieved, for example, during the
installation of the web browser or the operating system.
Attacker Model. We consider a remote network attacker
that has access to the channel between the client and the
server. The attacker has either compromised the secret key
corresponding to the server’s TLS certificate or obtained a
valid TLS certificate for the server’s domain through a com-
promised CA.
The attacker may also possess one or more SIMs regis-
tered with LCS. The SIMs allow the adversary to “appear”
at certain locations with respect to LCS. Regarding his lo-
cation, we assume the attacker to be remote and does not
co-locate with the server. In other words, the location of the
attacker’s SIMs and the location of any of the web server’s
SIMs are always different, according to LCS. Finally, we as-
sume that the attacker does not compromise LCS or DNS.
Solution Overview. As depicted in Figure 2, SALVE con-
sists of two phases: Location-Aware DNS Lookup (laDNS)
and Location-Aware TLS Handshake (laTLS).
During the first phase, the client fetches the server’s IP
address and legitimate locations from DNS with DNSSEC
enabled. This is integrated with the typical DNS lookup.
In the second phase, the client and the server engage in a
modified TLS handshake, which involves the steps described
below. The client first receives and validates the server’s
certificate as in a standard TLS handshake. If the valida-
tion is successful, the client verifies the server’s location as
an additional authentication factor as follows. During the
handshake, the GMLC issues the server a signed location
statement that certifies the server’s SIM location for this
specific TLS session. The server forwards this statement to
the client, who verifies its authenticity (using the public key
of the GMLC) and matches the location contained in the
statement against the server’s legitimate locations fetched
via laDNS. We describe these phases in further detail below.
3.2 Location-Aware DNS Lookup (laDNS)
During a Location-Aware DNS Lookup the client learns
the legitimate server locations, in addition to the server’s
IP address. As shown in the left-hand side of Figure 3,
we extend the standard DNS lookup to also fetch all the
legitimate locations of the servers of a given domain. Since
the web service could be deployed at multiple data centers,
the legitimate location information is composed of a set L of
possible server locations. Each location in L is encoded in a
LOC resource record. The LOC records are stored along with
other records in the corresponding authoritative DNS server.
We employ DNSSEC during the DNS lookup to ensure the
authenticity of resource records. At the end of this phase,
the client stores the legitimate server locations for later use.
We propose using DNS to store and disseminate legiti-
mate server locations since it is already used to store their
IP addresses. DNS is also used by current browsers when
visiting websites and is deployed on a large scale. The added
attack surface is minimal since the number of DNS server
keys relevant for a domain is small compared to the many
CAs trusted by browsers [20]. Aside from DNS, SALVE can
also use other trustworthy online databases. Alternatively,
browsers can store legitimate website locations in an offline
manner, similar to certificate pinning [64].
3.3 Location-Aware TLS Handshake (laTLS)
The Location-Aware TLS Handshake is a modified TLS
handshake where the client verifies the server’s location in
addition to validating its certificate. We design laTLS as a
TLS extension, which we later implement in modern TLS
libraries (OpenSSL and NSS) as detailed in Section 5. Mes-
sages exchanged by the parties are shown on the right-hand
side of Figure 3 where gray boxes depict our additions to
the standard TLS handshake.
The ClientHello message includes a custom extension
type to indicate the request for laTLS. Similarly, the Server-
Hello message contains the custom extension type to indi-
cate the server’s support. Other messages used to negotiate
the master secret, denoted by k, remain unmodified. As
mentioned in Section 2.4, we consider the use of ephemeral
Diffie-Hellman key exchange to provide forward secrecy.
Upon receiving the client’s Finished message, the server
requests the GMLC to issue a location statement for its SIM
using the MLP protocol. For efficiency, this request takes
place over a long-term TLS connection that lasts across dif-
ferent client connections. The request issued by the server
includes the hash of the master secret (i.e., h(k)) as an
identifier of the client-server handshake. The request also
contains the server’s credentials to access the GMLC. The
GMLC uses the credentials to check that the requester (i.e.,
the server) is authorized to query for the SIM specified in the
request, and aborts if this check fails. If requester authen-
tication succeeds, the GMLC replies with a signature, com-
puted using its private key skG, over h(k) and the latest loca-
tion information of the server SIM. The location information
in Figure 3 is composed of the location denoted by ` and the
time t at which localization was performed. The server re-
ceives the signed location statement and forwards it to the
client in a new TLS message type—LocationStatement.
GMLCClient www.example.com
Server
ClientHello (with SALVE ext.)
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Certificate
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished
ServerHello (with SALVE ext.)
Certificate
ServerKeyExchange
CertificateRequest
ServerHelloDone
Root DNS
.com DNS
example.com DNS
D
N
SSEC
 chain of trust
Server IP address
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Device localization
Location-Aware DNS Lookup
Location-Aware TLS Handshake
LocationStatement:  
Finished
Notations
GMLC public key
GMLC private key
Server location
Cryptographic hash function
Timestamp of location statement
Master secret of TLS channel
Figure 3: Location-based server authentication. SALVE messages in laTLS are shown in gray. The Gateway Mobile Location
Center (GMLC), as part of LCS, knows the location of the SIM attached to the server. The client learns the legitimate server
locations through laDNS. After exchanging keys with the client, the server sends a hash of the master secret k to the GMLC
to obtain a signed location statement. This statement is sent as the LocationStatement message to the client who verifies
the server’s location.
Upon receiving the location statement, the client verifies
the signature using the public key pkG of the GMLC. The
client also checks that the hash of the master secret in the
statement matches the one computed locally, and verifies
that the server is at a legitimate location according to the
set L. The determination of whether the server location is le-
gitimate is application-dependent. For example, the server’s
location in the location statement is legitimate if it matches
(exactly or is within a given threshold distance from) one
of the locations fetched from laDNS. For example, the legit-
imate server location can be set to the center of the data
center. The threshold can be set to less than a quarter of
the dimensions of the premises to prevent an attacker at the
edge from the data center from co-locating with the server.
The client also checks for the timestamp t in the location
statement and rejects statements where the time of the lo-
calization is older than a given threshold. If all these checks
are successful, the client accepts the server’s authenticity
and both peers start exchanging application data. Other-
wise, the client raises an alert to indicate an error and quits
the connection. We adopt the alert protocol in TLS, used by
clients to notify the server and quit the connection upon var-
ious errors, such as an invalid server certificate, a mismatch
in the server’s Finished message, a decryption failure, etc.
To ensure the order of the messages, the client also raises an
alert and terminates the connection if it receives Location-
Statement message before the Finished message.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The adversary successfully impersonates a victim server
if it obtains a location statement from the GMLC that the
client accepts. Such a statement must include the hash of
the master secret h(k) expected by the client, a location
that matches the set of legitimate server locations, and a
timestamp that is not later than a pre-defined threshold.
In order to account for our defined adversary who has
the secret key of the legitimate server, we focus on the
DHE-variants of TLS (e.g., TLS DHE, TLS ECDHE). In
the case of RSA-based key exchange (e.g., TLS RSA), the
client chooses the master secret and sends it encrypted using
the server’s public key. This allows the adversary who knows
the server’s secret key to decrypt the message and obtain the
master secret. The adversary then acts as a passive man-
in-the-middle and lets the legitimate server carry out the
entire handshake (including the location verification). After
the client authenticates the server, the adversary uses the
master secret to derive the session keys of the TLS channel
and effectively hijacks the connection.
DHE-based key exchange prevents a passive man-in-the-
middle from learning the master secret agreed upon by the
client and the server. Therefore, the above attack would not
work and, in the following, we only consider active man-in-
the-middle attacks.
4.1 Active Man-in-the-Middle
An active man-in-the-middle attacker can engage in two
TLS handshakes, one with the client (acting as the server)
and one with the server (acting as the client). This attacker
therefore establishes two master secrets: one with the client
(denoted by kca) and one with the server (denoted by kas).
For simplicity, let `s be the legitimate server location (the
one expected by the client) and let `a be the adversary’s
location. Since the adversary is remote, `s 6= `a. During
laTLS, the client expects a location statement containing
[h(kca), `s, t]. If the adversary asks the GLMC for a location
statement of its own SIM, it receives [h(kca), `a, t], which
would be rejected by the client because the location does
not match the expected one. If the adversary relays the
location statement [h(kas), `s, t] forwarded by the legitimate
server, the client rejects it because it does not contain the
expected hash of the master secret.
Finally, we note that a location statement request carries
the hash of the master secret, so that the GMLC cannot
learn the master secret and tamper with the TLS channel
between the client and the server.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
We develop a proof-of-concept implementation of SALVE
by integrating and modifying existing software. Our modifi-
cations consist of roughly 1200 lines of code. The implemen-
tation is composed of the following components: (i) a DNS
server, (ii) the TLS libraries, (iii) the web server, (iv) the
client, and (v) the GMLC.
DNS. We use bind9 [34] to set up a DNS server to store
an A and a LOC resource record for the web server. We
further enable DNSSEC support and populate all resource
records with the necessary DNSSEC resource records (RRSIG
records) so that the DNS (particularly LOC) records can be
authenticated. We use delv to issue laDNS queries from the
client side for evaluation. No modifications are required here
since the existing DNS and DNSSEC are used.
TLS Libraries. We implement SALVE in the OpenSSL
(version 1.0.2a) and the Network Security Services (NSS,
version 3.18 RTM) libraries. For all TLS handshakes, we
use the ephemeral elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange
and use SHA256 as the cryptographic hash function for gen-
erating the master secret. For laTLS, we use RSA with a
2048-bit key to sign and verify location statements. As a
result, a location statement including its signature (encoded
using Base64) is around 490 bytes in the format of MLP.
Web Server. We use the Apache HTTP Server 2.4.12
with the modified OpenSSL library that supports laTLS.
As mentioned in Section 3.3, to reduce the overhead of re-
establishing connections to the GMLC for every client con-
nection, we modify Apache to maintain persistent TLS con-
nections to the GMLC.
Client. We use two HTTP clients: a Chromium browser to
evaluate client performance and ApacheBench (ab) for server
benchmarks. We compiled Chromium (version 44.0.2388.0)
with the modified OpenSSL library and ApacheBench (ver-
sion 2.3) with the modified NSS library to support laTLS.
GMLC. We use RestComm GMLC [5], an existing GMLC
implementation, and modify it to include our extension to
issue signed location statements. The GMLC stores the lo-
cation of the web server to issue location statements, which
are represented in XML format based on the MLP standard.
6. EVALUATION
We evaluate our implementation in a real-world deploy-
ment to demonstrate the feasibility of SALVE.
6.1 Goals and Methodology
Our goal is to evaluate SALVE’s overhead due to the mod-
ifications that the location-aware DNS lookup (laDNS) and
the location-aware TLS handshake (laTLS) entail. We now
introduce the deployment of SALVE components, the ex-
periments executed, and the metrics used to quantify the
performance of the system.
Deployment. The DNS server runs on a machine with an
Intel Core i7 CPU at 2.7 GHz and 4 GB RAM. We run
the web server on a workstation with an Intel Core i7-4770
CPU at 3.40 GHz and 32 GB RAM in Switzerland. We
envision that the GMLC, as part of the Location Service,
is deployed on a large scale by telecommunication service
providers, e.g., using a cloud platform. Therefore, we de-
ploy a GMLC server on Amazon EC2 in Germany using the
instance type m4.xlarge, consisting of a quad-core 2.4 GHz
Intel Xeon E5-2676 processor and 16 GB RAM.
To reduce network effects, we first run the client locally
on the same machine that hosts the web server. To observe
the real-world performance impact on a large scale, we fur-
ther deploy the client in Switzerland and in the following
countries using PlanetLab: Germany (Goettingen), the US
(Indiana) and Japan (Hiroshima).
Experiments. For laDNS, we use a locally-connected client
to compare the performance of 200 lookups for the (i) the
server’s IP address and (ii) the server’s IP address and lo-
cation (encoded in a LOC record).
For laTLS, we evaluate the server-side performance with
clients running ApacheBench from different locations. The
benchmark is performed with various levels of client concur-
rency (1 to 500 concurrent clients). Each benchmark con-
figuration is executed on 50,000 fresh TLS handshakes or at
least 10 minutes for both the standard TLS handshake and
laTLS. For the client-side performance, we run Chromium
on the client to measure the overhead of verifying a location
statement. During evaluation, we compare the performance
of laDNS and laTLS against their respective vanilla solutions.
Performance Metrics. For our evaluation, we quantify
the performance of SALVE in terms of latency and through-
put measured during its two phases: laDNS and laTLS. For
laDNS, we focus on the latency experienced by the client
when performing single lookups. More specifically, we mea-
sure the time between the client issuing a DNS request to
the reception and validation of the retrieved records.
For laTLS, we focus on three aspects: (i) the server-side
latency by measuring the time between the server receiving a
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution of server-side TLS handshake times for different numbers of concurrent clients evaluated
locally on the server. laTLS adds a delay to the distribution of the standard TLS handshake, which increases with the addition
of concurrent clients (heavier load).
ClientHello to finally sending the Finished message at the
end of the handshake (this includes the time for requesting
the location statement from the GMLC and forwarding it
to the client), (ii) the throughput by computing the average
number of requests per second over a fixed period of time,
and (iii) the client-side overhead for verifying the signature
of the location statement and its contents.
6.2 Location-Aware DNS Lookup
We expect the laDNS to be efficient since it only requires
the client to fetch the legitimate locations of the server while
it fetches the IP address. Since our web server is deployed
at a single location, the client fetches one LOC record dur-
ing laDNS. The additional payload amounts to 420 bytes
(30 bytes for the LOC record and 390 bytes for its corre-
sponding RRSIG record, including record headers).
Our experiments show that the overhead of laDNS is rea-
sonable compared to the time for a standard DNS lookup.
A standard DNS lookup takes 36.7 milliseconds on average
(standard deviation 4.81 milliseconds). A round of laDNS is
45.02 milliseconds on average (standard deviation 5.81 mil-
liseconds), implying an increase of 8.3 milliseconds (23%).
Regardless of whether the DNS lookup includes location in-
formation, the DNS lookup time is typically amortized by
caching the query results and using them in future connec-
tions, as long as the DNS records do not expire. DNS records
expiration is defined in a time-to-live (TTL) field set by the
authoritative DNS server. Given that typical DNS records
can be valid for up to 5 days [12], the overhead of laDNS
is acceptable as it does not need to be performed for each
client connection.
6.3 Location-Aware TLS Handshake
To reduce the effect of network latencies between the client
and the server, we first analyze the results measured locally
on the server machine. For a holistic view of server per-
formance in a real-world setting, we further evaluate the
performance with external client machines using PlanetLab.
Server-side Latency. We first show that laTLS does not
affect system stability in terms of the latency of TLS hand-
shakes. To demonstrate this, we observe the cumulative
distribution of handshake latencies measured by the local
benchmark with different numbers of concurrent client con-
nections. As shown in Figure 4, the distribution of laTLS
latencies is shifted to the right compared to the standard
TLS handshake. The shift is due to the extra round-trip-
time (RTT) spent by the server for requesting a location
statement for each fresh client connection.
In further detail, laTLS adds a minor overhead to the
TLS handshake time. We compare its latency with the
standard TLS handshake for various numbers of concurrent
clients executed locally on the server (using ApacheBench),
as shown in Figure 5. laTLS takes roughly 0.03 to 0.23 sec-
onds more than a standard TLS handshake. As before, this
is attributed to the round-trip communication between the
server and the GMLC. Since web pages loading times are
on the order of a few seconds [36], such an overhead is not
easily perceptible.
Server-side Throughput. laTLS does not significantly
impact server throughput. We observe the number of re-
quests the server handled during the benchmark time for
each client concurrency level, as shown in Figure 6. The
number of requests per second is reduced by an average of
4.3% when compared to the standard TLS handshake.
The server-side throughput is also stable across time. We
measure the average requests per second every 15 seconds
and observe a stable reduction between laTLS and the stan-
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Figure 5: Server-side TLS handshake times for different
numbers of concurrent clients evaluated locally on the server
(median with standard deviation). The added latency (0.03
to 0.23 seconds) is primarily due to the round-trip commu-
nication between the web server and the GMLC.
dard TLS handshake, as shown in Figure 7. This stable
impact to throughput is also observed across different levels
of client concurrency.
Since server throughput is a key indicator for website per-
formance, we further evaluate SALVE on a global scale using
PlanetLab. We observe that the server does not experience a
noticeable performance penalty for remote clients. As shown
in Figure 8, the server handles connections from Germany,
the US, and Japan with little or unnoticeable impact on
throughput. This is due to the network delays between the
client and the server, which overshadow the overhead due to
the server-to-GMLC communication.
Client-side Verification. The verification of the location
statement done on the client side is efficient. We measure the
time required for the client to validate the location statement
in our modified Chromium browser. This includes checking
the GMLC’s signature on the location statement, verifying
that the hash of the master secret matches the one computed
locally on the master secret of the channel, and determining
whether the location matches the legitimate server location
fetched via laDNS. It takes, on average, 132 microseconds
(standard deviation 40 microseconds) to verify a location
statement. Since web page loading times are typically on
the order of a few seconds [36], the sub-millisecond overhead
of this verification is negligible for most web applications.
7. DISCUSSION
We now discuss the limitations of SALVE and possible
improvements. We then explore deployment and the inte-
gration with other web mechanisms and protocols.
7.1 Limitations
SALVE has some limitations due to the use of various
components in our system, from server deployment to the
current state of LCS.
IaaS Clouds. This work is partly motivated by the trend of
using private data centers for security-critical applications.
However, a web service may also be deployed in IaaS clouds
like Amazon EC2. IaaS cloud deployments make it easier
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Figure 6: Server-side TLS handshake throughput for differ-
ent numbers of concurrent clients evaluated locally on the
server. The average number of requests per second is slightly
reduced (2% to 5%) due to the round-trip communication
between the web server and the GMLC.
for an attacker to be co-located with a target web service.
If the IaaS provider allows any customers to deploy SIM
cards in its data centers, an adversary may appear at a le-
gitimate location of a target web service. Therefore, SALVE
is only suited for security-critical applications hosted at pri-
vate sites that are difficult for an adversary to infiltrate.
Co-location can be prevented as a side-benefit of using
reverse proxies such as NGINX [47, 50], which are used to
offload TLS encryption from web servers in the public cloud.
Since reverse proxies are often deployed in private data cen-
ters with on-site security, the attacker cannot co-locate with
them and our solution applies.
Accuracy and precision of Location Estimation. The
location of the server’s SIM is estimated by LCS using tech-
niques such as Cell ID, U-TDOA, or Enhanced Cell IDs. The
accuracy and precision of these localization techniques di-
rectly affects the security of SALVE. If localization is coarse-
grained, an attacker may easily be located at a position that
would be considered valid by the client. This is a risk for
servers located in remote or suburban areas where location
estimation may be limited due to fewer surrounding base
stations. However, telecommunication operators often pro-
vide femtocells to increase cellular coverage. Such hardware
can therefore improve localization accuracy and precision.
In any case, our proposal benefits from the MLP’s abstrac-
tion of the underlying localization method, allowing future
improved techniques to be used when they become available.
Security of Localization Methods. Throughout the pa-
per, we assume the legitimate web server (and its SIM) to be
trusted. In the case of a dishonest server that tries to fake
its location, secure localization methods based on distance
bounding [16,18] can be used to provide verifiable locations.
Device locations can also be estimated using base stations
with undisclosed locations [19].
7.2 Extensions and Optimizations
SALVE can be further improved and adapted to fit into a
larger application space which we now describe.
Thwarting Co-Located Attackers. As discussed, web
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Figure 7: Server-side TLS handshake throughput for different number of concurrent clients evaluated locally on the server over
180 seconds, during which we observe stable performance. For all client concurrency levels, laTLS incurs a minor reduction
on the number of client requests that the server can handle concurrently.
services are often deployed across multiple data centers. We
now consider an attacker that is co-located with some data
centers, potentially due to on-site physical breach [66] or
the inaccuracy of localization. To address this, the location
statement can be extended to contain all current server lo-
cations the server’s credential is allowed to request from the
GMLC. More specifically, the domain owner can specify all
the server’s credentials to be authorized to query for all the
domain’s server locations from the GMLC. Upon request
by the client, the server requests the GMLC for a location
statement that includes the locations of all the SIMs of all
the servers where the web service is deployed. The GMLC
checks that the server is authorized to request all SIM loca-
tions in the query. Upon receiving the location statement,
the client checks that the locations of all the servers included
in the statement match all the legitimate locations fetched
from laDNS. While this extension may incur higher verifica-
tion times, the partially co-located attacker cannot imper-
sonate the server.
Location Privacy. Server location may be a valuable as-
set which an online service provider does not want to dis-
close. In scenarios where location privacy is desired, the
client should be able to check that the server is at the correct
location without learning its exact position. A simple way
to achieve location privacy is to include coarse-grained loca-
tion information in the LOC records. Similarly, the GMLC
should use the same coordinate resolution in the location
statement. For example, the GMLC may allow the server to
specify the location accuracy and precision with which the
object of the query should be localized. Alternatively, our
solution can use anonymous credentials [17] to realize the
location statement in a privacy-preserving way.
Improved Concurrency Handling. In the current solu-
tion, the server requests a location statement for each indi-
vidual TLS connection. While our implementation demon-
strates the efficiency of communicating with the GMLC,
such a mechanism can be improved. One option is to lever-
age Merkle trees [45] and request a single aggregated location
statement for a series of client connections. In particular,
given N incoming clients in a given time frame, the server
constructs a Merkle tree where the leaf nodes are the master
secret hashes of the N TLS sessions. The root hash of the
Merkle tree is computed and sent to the GMLC. The re-
sulting location statement consists of the root hash and the
server’s location. Using the LocationStatement message,
the server sends the location statement to each client along
with the necessary sibling hash values needed by each client
to compute the root hash. As shown in Figure 9, for ex-
ample, the server sends to Client 1 the location statement,
along with the hash values h(k2) and h1, for Client 1 to
compute and verify the root hash.
Prevention against Protocol Downgrades. Recall that
during laTLS, the server echos the SALVE extension type
in the ServerHello to indicate its support. To circumvent
SALVE, the attacker who impersonates the server can leave
out this extension type to claim that it does not support
laTLS. To prevent such an attack, an additional DNS record
may be defined and populated on the DNS server to indicate
to the client (during laDNS) the requirement and capability
of SALVE on the server side. Additionally, for known critical
web services, the client may be configured to strictly require
laTLS and disconnect if the server does not support it.
7.3 Deployment and Integration
We discuss how SALVE can be practically deployed and
how it can be integrated with existing techniques.
Loca
l
Swit
zerla
nd
Germ
any US Japa
n
Client Location
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
A
ve
ra
ge
R
eq
ue
st
s
p
er
S
ec
on
d
Standard TLS
Location-aware TLS
(a) 1 concurrent client
Loca
l
Swit
zerla
nd
Germ
any US Japa
n
Client Location
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
A
ve
ra
ge
R
eq
ue
st
s
p
er
S
ec
on
d
Standard TLS
Location-aware TLS
(b) 100 concurrent clients
Loca
l
Swit
zerla
nd
Germ
any US Japa
n
Client Location
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
A
ve
ra
ge
R
eq
ue
st
s
p
er
S
ec
on
d
Standard TLS
Location-aware TLS
(c) 200 concurrent clients
Loca
l
Swit
zerla
nd
Germ
any US Japa
n
Client Location
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
A
ve
ra
ge
R
eq
ue
st
s
p
er
S
ec
on
d
Standard TLS
Location-aware TLS
(d) 300 concurrent clients
Loca
l
Swit
zerla
nd
Germ
any US Japa
n
Client Location
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
A
ve
ra
ge
R
eq
ue
st
s
p
er
S
ec
on
d
Standard TLS
Location-aware TLS
(e) 400 concurrent clients
Loca
l
Swit
zerla
nd
Germ
any US Japa
n
Client Location
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
A
ve
ra
ge
R
eq
ue
st
s
p
er
S
ec
on
d
Standard TLS
Location-aware TLS
(f) 500 concurrent clients
Figure 8: Server-side TLS handshake throughput for different number of concurrent clients evaluated from different nodes using
PlanetLab. For all client concurrency levels, the difference between the throughput of laTLS and standard TLS handshakes
becomes unnoticeable as the client is geographically more distant from the server.
Incremental Deployment. SALVE can be incrementally
deployed since all modifications are backward compatible
(modifications to TLS and MLP are both implemented as
extensions). First, the Location Service upgrades its GMLC
to offer location statement issuing for subscribed SIMs. Web
services then equip their servers with SIMs and subscribe to
the GMLC. They then register their server locations into
DNS and install TLS libraries that support laTLS. Finally,
browser developers can implement support for laDNS and
laTLS to request location-based server authentication.
SALVE is backward compatible as unsupported browsers
would not request the SALVE TLS extension. Unsupported
websites would not store location information in DNS and
would not respond to the SALVE TLS extension type.
Websites use various protocol enhancements to improve
the performance of TLS traffic. We discuss how SALVE can
be seamlessly integrated with them.
TLS Renegotiation. TLS renegotiation allows the client
or the server to re-establish a TLS session using a new TLS
handshake [58]. Our solution is implemented as part of the
TLS handshake and therefore supports TLS renegotiation.
If the new TLS handshake is performed over an existing
TLS session that has already verified the server’s location,
a second location verification may be optional.
TLS Resume. SALVE supports TLS resumption as long as
the server locations do not change. Past TLS sessions can be
resumed by the client, specifying the past session identifier
in the ClientHello message [22] to the server. The session
can be resumed with the same master secret if the server
has the session in its cache. Upon resuming the session,
the client may optionally request a new verification of the
server’s location by renegotiation.
TLS False Start. TLS False Start [39] allows TLS end-
points to send data before the handshake completes, pro-
vided that the key exchange is TLS DHE or TLS ECDHE
and the symmetric cipher used for application data is strong
enough. Essentially, the Finished messages retroactively
validates the success of the handshake. In our laTLS, the
LocationStatement message also acts as another retroactive
validation of the handshake using location-based authenti-
cation. Therefore, the client should not send sensitive data
to or authenticate data from the server before receiving and
verifying the LocationStatement. The same rationale ap-
plies to TLS 1.3 [56], which allows the client to send data
along with the ClientHello message in the 0-RTT mode,
before the server’s certificate is validated.
TLS Proxy. TLS proxies are often used to allow a network
middlebox to analyze the traffic (e.g., for malware detec-
tion) and apply security policies [44]. Middleboxes are often
installed on the client’s gateway to the Internet and can be
Client 1 Server GMLC
Client 2
Client 3
Client 4
Merkle tree
Figure 9: Improved laTLS using aggregated location state-
ments. Instead of requesting the GMLC for a location state-
ment for each client, the server uses a Merkle tree to aggre-
gate a set of master secrets with the clients and requests
only one statement that contains the top hash of the tree.
perceived as a sanctioned man-in-the-middle. During the
TLS handshake, the client establishes a TLS session with
the proxy, which in turn establishes a TLS session with the
server. Since it is the TLS proxy that actually connects to
websites, it should be in charge of verifying the locations of
all the connected servers using our approach.
Reverse Proxies. Some data centers often use reverse
proxies at the network boundary of their actual servers to
improve efficiency [23]. Essentially, the TLS session ends
here and application data travels within the data center
stripped of the TLS layer. laTLS should therefore verify
the locations of the reverse proxies. Similarly, the DNS LOC
records should specify the locations of the reverse proxies,
rather than the ones of the actual application servers. Fi-
nally, the SIM of the server should be installed at the reverse
proxy so that the GMLC can provide location statements
that match the legitimate location distributed via laDNS.
Data Center Load Balancing. Websites often perform
load balancing across different servers within the same data
center. If TLS connections terminate at these servers (in-
stead of a TLS proxy), then all server locations should be
stored in the DNS for laTLS to succeed. As an optimization,
servers in the same data center can have their SIMs installed
at the same location to reduce the number of corresponding
LOC records in DNS.
Datagram TLS. Datagram TLS realizes TLS on datagram
traffic in UDP [57]. Since it uses the same handshake pro-
tocol, laTLS is directly applicable to it.
SPDY and HTTP/2. SPDY [13] and HTTP/2 [14] are
new protocols that improve network efficiency by multiplex-
ing HTTP requests to the same domain over a single shared
TLS channel. SPDY also provides IP pooling, allowing mul-
tiple HTTP sessions to use the same TLS connection for
servers with the same IP address. Since laTLS checks the lo-
cation statement against the locations of the domain, server
authentication succeeds when the IP address maps to the
same set of legitimate server locations.
Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC). QUIC is
an experimental protocol proposed by Google that achieves
higher performance over UDP [60]. To boost efficiency,
clients can start sending data to the server, encrypted under
the server’s public key, before establishing the ephemeral ses-
sion key. laTLS can be coupled with QUIC. However, since
we consider an attacker who compromises the server’s secret
key, no sensitive data should be sent before the ephemeral
session key is established.
Keying Material Exporters. Key Material Exporters [55]
is a mechanism that allows secrets derived during a TLS
handshake to be exported and used in the upper layer ap-
plications. In this work, we choose to implement SALVE
within the TLS handshake since it is where the server is orig-
inally authenticated (using its certificate). This also relieves
developers of the burden to implement location verification
for each desired application. However, we can also use key
material exporters to expose secrets to the upper level ap-
plications to perform location-based server authentication.
For example, the hash of the master secret, h(k), can be
exposed to the server (Apache) and the client (Chromium).
The server can contact the GMLC to obtain the location
statement and send it over the established TLS channel to
the client to be verified.
8. RELATEDWORK
There has been considerable research efforts on location-
based services [40,42,63]. They mostly focus on proving the
location on the client side, while this work uses location to
strengthen server authentication. Other solutions exist for
enhancing server authentication in TLS and we summarize
them below. We refer the reader to the work by Clark and
van Oorschot [20] for a more detailed treatment of current
HTTPS and TLS enhancements.
Enforcing HTTPS. To prevent attacks that steal user
credentials by using HTTP (instead of HTTPS), one could
use the HTTP Strict Transport Security. This enables the
server to inform the client that only HTTPS sessions are al-
lowed [35]. Furthermore, Upgrade Insecure Requests allow
websites to easily migrate to HTTPS by notifying the client
browser using the HTTP header [69].
Certificate Revocation. Revocation mechanisms have
been proposed for wrongly issued, fraudulent, or compro-
mised certificates [48]. The Online Certificate Status Pro-
tocol (OCSP) allows the client to check the validity of the
server’s certificate during the TLS handshake [62]. OCSP
stapling is also proposed as a TLS extension that allows the
server to send certificate status to the client during a TLS
handshake [25]. Short-lived certificates enable the use of cer-
tificates with a shorter validity and therefore require CAs to
issue fresh certificates more frequently [67].
Multi-path Probing. Multi-path probing refers to veri-
fying a server’s certificate based on evidence observed from
different independent sources. Existing examples of such
solutions include the Certificate Transparency project [38]
and the use of Perspectives [70]. Perspectives allows a client
to fetch records related to the server’s key from trusted no-
taries that store the history of keys used by that server. The
Certificate Transparency project proposes using a public log
of certificates for auditing.
Pinning. Key pinning solutions restrict the set of server
public keys that are trusted by a client. This prevents an
attacker who obtains a fraudulent certificate over his own
public-private key pair from impersonating the server. Cert-
Lock is a Firefox add-on that caches the information of CAs
used in a certificate [65]. Web servers may also provide pin-
ning information to clients, as proposed in the Public Key
Pinning Extension for HTTP [64]. DANE uses DNS and
DNSSEC to store the pinning of CAs, server public keys,
and server certificates [31]. In general, browser developers
may also include their own key pinning information; this
is implemented, for instance, in modern browsers, such as
Firefox [4] and Chrome [20].
Comparison. All the above solutions address server au-
thentication by restricting the impact of fraudulent certifi-
cates or reducing the window of attack for the adversary.
In contrast to certificate-based approaches, we use a physi-
cal property of the server, its geographic location, to realize
second-factor server authentication.
Using laDNS and laTLS, SALVE binds the server’s loca-
tion to the session. Such a binding is similar to the concept
of TLS session-aware (TLS-SA) user authentication [52,53].
TLS-SA achieves user authentication by binding the user’s
credentials to the session of the authentic client; this allows
the server to determine whether its session with the client
is the same as that observed by the client. The difference
here is that we apply such a binding on the server end and
use an external party to certify the server’s property (geo-
graphic location). As a result, the client can check whether
the TLS session is the same as the session over which the
server sends the location statement.
9. CONCLUSION
Remote web server authentication has been a challenging
problem. As a solution, we leveraged the server location as a
second factor of its authenticity. We implemented location-
based server authentication with only minor modifications
to existing software. SALVE prevents server impersonation
even if a remote attacker possesses the secret key of the vic-
tim server. Our approach requires no user intervention and
incurs minimal impact to real-world performance. This work
motivates the future use of various properties of protected
data centers for stronger server authentication guarantees.
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